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A call to resist illegitimate authority

March 1985

The Politics of Famine in Ethiopia
JONATHAN B. TUCKER
Despite extensive coverage of the
Ethiopian famine in the media, few
Americans are aware that the crisis,
like earlier famines in Cambodia and
Biafra, has its roots in war and politics
as well as drought.
The northern provinces of Tigre and
Eritrea, which have been worst hit by
the famine, have also been embroiled
for many years in armed struggles
against the central government in
Addis Ababa. As many as 3.8 million
Tigreans and 2 million Eritreans are in
danger of starvation, yet the ongoing
civil wars have cut off the vast majority
of these victims from aid programs run
by the Ethiopian government and the
international aid agencies operating
under its auspices. "Because of the
fighting, very little of the food contributed by the United States and other
donor countries is reaching the starving
in the rebel-controlled areas," says
Dan Connell, a former Reuters correspondent in Ethiopia and now executive director of Grassroots International, a relief agency based in Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Although Connell is one of the few
people involved who will talk about it,
it is an open secret among relief
workers that more than half the famine
victims in Ethiopia are not being
reached by the government's programs. Ethipia's ruling military junta,

Hundreds of thousands of Tigrayans migrate to Sudan in search of food and security.

led by Lieut. Col. Mengistu Haile
Mariam, is covering up the fact, and
foreign diplomats and relief agency officials have been reluctant to reveal it
for fear the government will curtail
their operations altogether. Even more
disturbing, there is strong evidence that
the government has deliberately withheld food from rebel-controlled areas
in Eritrea and Tigre in order to starve
the insurgents into submission.
Thousands of noncombatants there
have died from hunger.
Unfortunately, the United States is

tacitly abetting this use of famine as a
weapon. In an interview last March,
Hunter Farnham, a senior official with
the Agency for International Development (A.I.D.), said that famine victims
in areas not controlled by the Ethiopian government are ''really over a
barrel in terms of the U.S. being able
to help them directly." He added, "I
can tell you that we're quite concerned
about this situation, and we'd like to
be more responsive to the noncombatants who are really suffering the

Continued on page Two

Politics of Famine
Continued from page One
most.'' Although Farnham implied
that the problem is a logistical one, it is
political. The Reagan Administration
is attempting to woo Ethiopia away
from the Soviet Union, so it has been
reluctant to provide direct aid to
famine victimes living in rebelcontrolled areas. So far the United
States has pledged 210,000 tons of
food to Ethiopia, the largest amount of
famine relief in our history. But 90 percent of all international assistance to
Ethiopia is being channeled to areas
under government control and is thus
subject to the junta's direction.
Who are the insurgents and why are
they fighting? Historically, Ethiopia's
forty-odd ethnic groups have been oppressed by the Amhara tribe, which
continues to control the central government. Over the past decade, however, a
number of armed resistance movements have emerged. The Tigre People's Liberation Front (T.P.L.F.),
established in 1975, seeks a decentralized popular government to represent
equally all the nationalities within
Ethiopia.
Although government troops occupy
nine major towns in Tigre, the
T.P.L.F. holds more than 85 percent
of the rural areas. In the villages under
its control, the front has organized
People's Councils which have jmplemented land reform, built schools
and clinics, and provided agricultural
assistance and local security. Because
of those tangible benefits, many
peasants in rebel-held areas are sympathetic to the front.
Civil conflict has also raged for more
than two decades in the Pennsylvaniasize territory of Eritrea, which is
coveted by otherwise landlocked
Ethiopia for its coast along the Red
Sea. Ever since Emperor Haile
Selassie's annexationof Eritrea in 1962,
an independence movement has fought
against successive regimes in Addis
Ababa, but after twenty-three years the
conflict remains stalemated. Today,
the Eritrean People's Liberation Front
(E.P.L.F.) occupies about 85 percent
of the province outside the major
cities, and it has established extensive
administrative structures in the areas
under its control. Although massive
government offensives have hurled the
rebels back temporarily, the army has
failed to occupy the countryside.
After a coup ended Haile Selassie's
forty-four-year reign, in September
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1974, a Marxist junta known as the
Derg ("committee") took power, and
following a bloody power struggle,
Colonel Mengistu became its supreme
leader. Because of the Derg's human
rights violations and communist leanings, U .S.-Ethiopian relations became
increasingly strained, and in 1977 the
Soviet Union replaced the United
States as Ethiopia's superpower ally
and ·weapons supplier. Since then, the
Russians have provided the Derg an
estimated $2.5 billion in sophisticated
weaponry (including MI-24 helicopter
gunships and MIG-23 fighterbombers), along with some 1,400
military advisors, and Cuba has supplied 3,000 troops.
Today, nearly half Ethiopia's national budget goes to support a highly
mechanized army of 306,000 troops,
one of the largest military
establishments in sub-Saharan Africa.
The civil wars in Eritrea and Tigre are
costing the Derg approximately
$500,000 a day, according to The New
York Times, yet despite the huge investment of blood and treasure, victory
has remained elusive.
A series of military setbacks have led
the Derg to resort to increasingly brutal
forms of warfare, including scorchedearth tactics. In the spring of 1983, the
Ethiopian Army launched major offensives in Eritrea and Tigre which left
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massive destruction in their wake. According to Gayle Smith, a freelance
journalist who toured Tigre on foot
that year, the Ethiopian government
deliberately sought to bring about a
famine in the north as a way of
weakening the rebels. "The 1983 offensive was launched in western Tigre
- the only part of the province where
a grain surplus was achieved - and it
occured right after the harvest,'' Smith
says. "You can draw your own conclusions."
Government forces burned grain
supplies, fields a11d pasturelands using
incendiary bombs, cut down fruit orchards, shot domestic animals and
destroyed public schools and health
clinics built by the T.P.L.F. A similar
military offensive in Eritrea contributed to the famine there by disrupting planting in the southwestern part
of the territory bordering the Sudan.
The Ethiopian Air Force also bombed
towns and villages on market days, terrorizing the inhabitants. "It's basically
the old strategic-hamlet theory'' Grassroots International's Connell says,
drawing a parallel to U.S. counterinsurgency methods in Vietnam. "The
government used terror attacks and
hunger to drive the peope out of the
countryside and into official reception
centers in the main towns, which are
held by Ethiopian government forces.
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The goal is not so much to control the
peasants as to deny aid to the guerrillas."
Evidence has emerged recently that
the Ethiopian government is also diverting emergency food to the army and
militia. In October the governmentheld town of Lalibela was overrun in a
T.P.L.F.-led attack. According to
three Western relief workers there, the
rebels discovered large quantities of international food aid inside a government garrison.
The deteriorating security situation,
combined with communications and
transportation problems, have meant
that large areas of Eritrea and Tigre are
cut off from famine-relief efforts. During last spring and summer the key
roads to the north were often impassable because of fighting. Only a
few food convoys got through, accompanied by armed escorts. Moreover,
voluntary agencies working under the
auspices
of the Ethiopian
government's Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (R.R.C.) can
distribute food only in official centers
set up in the vicinity of governmentcontrolled garrison towns, such as
Mekele, the capital of Tigre.
"It's very difficult to reach the rural
areas through the regular channels,"
admits James Deharpporte of Catholic
Relief Services, which is working in
Eritrea and Tigre in cooperation with
the R.R.C. "The famine and the war
situation have caused people to come
to the urban areas where we have set up
feeding centers, and they are the major
beneficiaries.''
The only organizations providing
direct aid to famine victims in rural
areas of Eritrea and Tigre are two indigenous groups affiliated with the
rebels. The Eritrean Relief Association
(ERA) coordinates its activities with
the E.P.L.F. but is administered independently; the association's officials
say they provide food to all people in
need regardless of whether they support the guerrillas. So far, ERA has
managed an effective but seriously
underfinanced relief effort in behalf of
the 2 million Eritreans in danger of
starvation.
Similarly, the Relief Society of Tigre
(REST), a voluntary agency founded in
1978, is the only humanitarian organization operating in the guerrilla-controlled areas there. REST's administration and personnel are separate from
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the T.P.L.F.'s, although REST officials cooperate with the front and
with the People's Councils in the
villages.
According to Gayle Smith, ERA and
REST ''are so efficient that they could
be models for disaster relief anywhere
in the world." The bulk of the food
and supplies they allot is contributed
by European church organizations and
a handful of U.S. private voluntary
agencies working through the Sudan,
including Grassroots International,
Lutheran World Relief (New York City), Mercy Corps International (Portland, Oregon), Direct Relief International (Sacramento, California), the
Mennonite Central Committee
(Akron, Pennsylvania) and, since
November, Oxfam America (Boston).
The U.S. government provides small
amounts of indirect aid to ERA and
REST through those private relief
groups and the International Committee of the Red Cross. But although the
Ethiopian government reaches about
half of the famine victims, and ERA
and REST the other half, the rebel-

associated groups have far less food at
their disposal. "International aid is
running 20-to-l in favor of the government," Smith says. Many donors have
declined to work with ERA and REST
for fear either that the Ethiopian government might restrict the donors' programs or that food given to the agencies might end up feeding rebel
soldiers. So far, however, there is no
evidence that food aid from ERA or
REST has been diverted to the fronts.
Because the amounts of food and
supplies reaching the two organizations
have been so small, famine victims in
remote villages of Eritrea and Tigre
must travel to feeding centers in the
government-controlled towns. Those
who survive the journey are often badly treated, according to Chris Cartter,
associate director of Grassroots International,
who
toured
the ·
T.P.L.F.-controlled areas of Tigre in
November and interviewed a number
of migrating famine victims. He heard
accounts of intimidation, harassment
and even physical violence suffered at
the hands of Ethiopian officials.
Continued on page Four

,------""'"'-:-------or--.----,.----ITBIOPIA
Olpital:
Area:

Population:
Per capita income:
Ufe expectancy: ·
.Infant mortality:
Main nationalities:

Main religions:
Primary exports:

Addl,s Ababa
468, 7S0 sq. mi.
_
32.6 million (UN, 1980)
SlOO (UN, 1980)

37.S yrs (UN, 1980)
274 per 1-000 (0-4 yrs) .
Oromo, Anlbara, Tigrli, Somali, Sldama,
Gurage, Afar & others
Moslem, Orthodox Christian
Coffee, hides & skins, oil seeds, pulses
and vegetables·
TIGMY

Capital:
Area:
Population:
Refugees abroad~

Religions:

Makele
.S0-60,000 (boundary disputed)
4-5 million
150,000
Orthodox Christian, Moslem, Protestant,
Jewish (Falasha)

DITUA
Olpital:

Asmara
50,000 sq. mi.

Area:

Population~
Refugees abroad:
Nationalities:
,I'

Religions:
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3-4 million
1 million
Tigrai, Tigre, Salm, Bilayn, Afar;. Barya, .
Kunama, Rasbaida
Moslem, Orthodox Christiad, Protestant
& catholic
·
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Politics of Famine
Continued from page Three
''Several refugees told me that officials the near future and views the Derg's
in the government feeding centers resettlement plan as part of a strategy
asked them for an I.D. card, such as to depopulate Eritrea and Tigre so as
membership in a farmers' union,'' he to further weaken the insurgents.
says. "Because people from the
On December 3, Ethiopian governT.P.L.F.-controlled areas don't have ment aircraft strafed the Tigrean town
I.D.s, they were told to go to the back of Shellalo, killing eighteen people and
of the line or to come back the next wounding fifty-six. ''Shellalo lies on
day. Some were denied food and even the road to Kassala, the principal
migration route out of Tigre and the
beaten.''
Another source of the refugees' fear only food lifeline into the province,''
and mistrust of the official famine- Cartter says. "If the Ethiopian governrelief program is a new government ment seals off the road to Kassala, it
policy. In November, the Derg began will mean certain death for hundreds
implementing wat it called "a long- of thousands of people within weeks.''
term solution'' to the famine, which
Officially, the United States
consists of resettling peasants from allocates food aid according to need,
Eritrea and Tigre to areas that are sup- regardless of the political orientation
posedly more fertile in the southern of the recipient country. "A hungry
provinces of Welega and Ilubabor. child knows no politics," A.I.D. adMore than 70,000 people from Tigre ministrator M. Peter McPherson said
have been moved to the south in recently. But critics contend that U.S.
trucks, buses and Soviet Antonov emergency food aid has in fact been
transport aircraft, and the Ethiopian heavily influenced by political congovernment plans to resettle a total of siderations, with disproportionate
1.5 million people there by the end of amounts of aid going to countries that
the year. In many cases, peasants have are either of strategic value to the
been removed from their ancestral United States or that align themselves
lands against their will. According to a with U.S. interests.
recent report in The Christian Science
Because of Ethiopia's strategic locaMonitor, villages in Tigre have been tion on the Horn of Africa, within striksurrounded by troops at night and their ing distance of the Red Sea and the
inhabitants herded into trucks which Persian Gulf, it has long been a focus
take them to the new settlements.
of geopolitical rivaly between the
Mistreatment in the feeding centers superpowers. Under Haile Selassie, the
and forced resettlement policies, United States had access to the
together with ERA and REST's inabili- Eritrean Red Sea coast and maintained
ty to provide enough food, have led to an important electronic listening post
a massive exodus from the rebel-held at Kagnew Communications Station in
areas. Cartter reports that starving Asmara, the capital of Eritrea. Thus,
peasants are leaving their vilalges at a ever since the Carter Administration
rate of 10,000 a week for the refugee "lost" Ethiopia to the Russians, the
camps across the Sudanese border. U.S. government has sought by various
New arrivals at the border number means to lure the Derg back into the
around 120,000, and some 60,000 Western camp. Now the Reagan Admigrants are making their way through ministration is employing emergency
Western Tigre. Although REST has set relief as a carrot and stick to achieve its
up dozens of checkpoints along the foreign-policy objectives.
.
route to provide the refugees with
The Soviet Union has established a
food, water and basic medical care, naval anchorage on Eritrea's Dahlak
thousands have died.
Archipelago and is reportedly installMeanwhile, the fighting has inten- ing a missle facility in the area. Those
sified in Eritrea and Tigre. Cartter, moves have aroused concern in Washwho witnessed a fire fight between ington about a new strategic threat on
rebels and government forces near the the Horn. The famine has also
Tigrean town of Aresa in late strengthened the Ethiopian governNovember, notes that 50,000 troops ment's military position vis-a-vis the
have been aclded to the Ethiopian Ar- insurgencies in Eritrea and Tigre,
my as a result of the junta's new policy possibly opening the way for conquest
of conscription. According to the vice of the rebel-held territories. Such a
chairman of the T.P.L.F., the front ex- development would represent a major
pects a major government offensive in strategic advance for the Soviet Union.
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Although the Administration began
sending emergency food aid to
Ethiopia in 1983, the quantities were
inadequate to the magnitude of the
famine. Not until October 23, when a
graphic BBC film of the famine was
broadcast on the NBC Nightly News,
was the American public alerted to the
vast human tragedy under way. The
shocking images of suffering and death
triggered an outpouring of public concern and forced the Reagan Administration to expand its aid program
sharply. Yet a plea for increased aid
had been made by R.R.C. commissioner Dawit Wolde Giorgis in March,
six months earlier. Those months of
delay contributed to an untold number
of deaths.
The Rev. Charles Elliot, a British
relief official, recently charged that the·
United States and Britain had intentionally delayed large-scale relief
assistance to Ethiopia in the belief that
widespread famine would trigger the
overthrow of the Derg and bring a oroWestern regime to power. (Indeed, a
major cause of the coup that ousted
Haile Selassie was the Emperor's
cover-up of the severe famine of
1972-73 in which more than 200,000
people died. Apparently he had felt
that a request for emergency relief
would tarnish his international
prestige.) But the current famine has
had the opposite effect, helping
Mengistu tighten his grip on power and
strengthening his ideological ties with
Moscow. On September 12, the Derg
celebrated its tenth anniversary with a
$100 million gala and announced the
formation of an official state Communist Party.
Despite the strength of EthiopianSoviet ties, U.S. policy-makers believe
that Ethiopia - like Egypt, the Sudan
and Somalia - can be induced by large
amounts of Western aid to change its
political orientation. They contend
that the expanded relief effort represents ''a theat to Soviet hegemony over
Ethiopia,'' Time reported in its
November 26 issue.
On November 2, the Administration
announced that instead of channeling
all famine aid through third parties
such as voluntary organizations and
U .N. agencies, it would send it directly
to the Ethiopian R.R.C. The Reagan
Administration also launched a propoganda offensive. A.I.D. administer
McPherson compared the United
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Entire villages congregate under trees during the day to prepare food out of sight of MIG fighter planes.

States' generosity with the Soviet
Union's meager shipments of food aid
and "callous indifference" to the
plight of its ally. McPherson's
righteous indigntion might have been
more appropriate if the United States
had been less tardy and more balanced
in its reponse to the crisis. In any event,
it was a transparent gesture of
salesmanship.
Because of the Administration's
desire to improve relations with the
Derg and eventually to displace the
Russians, it has been reluctant to provide large amounts of aid to ERA and
REST or to condemn the Derg's ruthless military tactics against rebel-held
areas of Eritrea and Tigre. The United
States has little incentive to support the
movements for self-determination
there, since the geopolitical prize it
covets is a united Ethiopian Empire
with its Eritrean coast intact; a
dismembered weakened Ethiopia
would be of little strategic value to
either superpower.
To date, Ethiopia has shown few
signs of responding to America's
courtship. Last month R.R.C. commissioner Giorgis attacked the United
States for its belated response to the
famine. His remarks drew an angry
retort from McPherson, who termed
the accusation ''a classic example of
biting the hand that feeds you." The
Reagan Administration may now be
hedging its bets - continuing to provide limited aid to ERA and REST in
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order to apply pressure on the Derg.
Another important variable in the
complex political equation is the
stability of the Sudan, America's closet
ally in the Horn. The regime of President Mohammed Gaafar el-Nimeiry is
shaky, and the country is beset by
severe drought, a renewed civil war in
the south, severe tensions with
Ethiopia and the burden of some
700,000 refugees. The influx of an additional 500,000 to 1 million refugees
from Eritrea and Tigre could well
destabilize the Sudan, creating another
opening for Soviet gains in the region.
If the United Staes wishes .to stem the
massive exodus from Ethiopia, it must
provide more food aid to Eritrea and
Tigre.
Geopolitical considerations aside, as
a first step toward alleviating the enormous human suffering in the two rebelcontrolled provinces, all donor governments should send more aid to ERA
and REST. "I would never tell the
U.S. not to give famine assistance to
the Ethiopian government,'' says Dan
Connell, "But if it's really
humanitarian aid, you have to work
where the victims are, and that includes
rebel-controlled areas.'' Most urgently
needed are trucks to deliver food that
has already arrived. REST has forty
trucks, with which it can transport only
1,000 tons of food a month; in order to
meet the need, hundreds more are required.
Even with increased relief, however,
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the suffering in Eritrea and Tigre cannot be dealt with until the fighting
stops. One million people in central
Tigre are so weak from hunger that
they are unable to migrate to the
Sudan. They have sold their seeds,
tools and oxen, and have no means of
production. Unless relief aid can reach
them, most will die.
Several aid agencies have proposed
an .internationally supervised cease-fire
that would permit large shipments of
grain, medicine and relief supplies
across political and military boundaries, including emergency airlifts of
food and supplies into the rebel-held
zones. Although guerrilla leaders in
both territories have offered to
negotiate a cease-fire, the Ethiopian
government has refused. R.R.C. commissioner Giorgis told The Washington
Post recently, ''Ethiopia will
never ... make a deal with terrorists
and secessionists."
Thus it will take an international
outcry to pressure the Derg to permit
aid to reach the forgotten people of
Eritrea and Tigre. ''The Ethiopian
famine has become caught up in global
politics and can only be solved at that
level," Cartter says. "If something is
not done soon, a lot of people will have
blood
on
their
hands.''

Jonathan Tucker is a Boston-based
journalist. This article was reprinted
with permission from The Nation.

JOB OPENING AT RESIST
We're looking for a full-time office
manager/coordinator who will coordinate our grants program, help write
and edit the newsletter and assist in developing fundraising efforts. Requirements include demonstrated experience
working with grassroots organizations,
proven communications and writing
skills, as well as typing ability, familiarity with bookkeeping and, of course,
a strong commitment to anti-racist,
feminist and anti-militarist politics.
Salary will be $14,000/year plus health
insurance and 3 weeks paid vacation.
We're asking for at least a two year
commitment starting in May 1985.
For those interested, send a cover
letter, resume and writing sample to
Resist by April 8th.
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Witnessing the Famine:
An Interview with Chris Cartier of Grassroots International

In

November of 1984, Chris Cartter,

an associate director of Grassroots International, a Boston-based relief
agency, toured the rebel-controlled
provinces of Tigray and Eritrea, the
areas most affected by the current f amine. Leading a Boston Globe reporter
and photographer and an NBC-TV
crew, Cartier and his entourage were
the first westerners to witness and document the massive famine in these
areas. The foilowing excerpts, taken
from an interview with Cartier conducted by Meredith Smith and Ken
Tangvik of the Resist staff, is meant to
complement the article presented in
this issue on The Politics of Famine in
Ethiopia, which should be read first.
Grassroots International has received grants from Resist in the past for its
educational projects. For more information contact Grassroots International, Box 312, Cambridge, MA
02139.
Before going into Eritrea and Tigray
I had heard from the Sudanese that
people were crossing the border at the
rate of 500 per day. But the Sudanese
heard in reports from Tigray that there
were going to be one quarter to one
half million new refugees within a few
months. The figures didn't make sense
because the flow of refugees at the time
was not nearly that great. When I left
on the trip, though, the story of the
famine was breaking so fast that even
the Tigrayans I talked to in Khartoum
and in Kassala, couldn't explain to me
what I was going to see because they
didn't know it themselves.
Western Tigray has long been the
bread basket of the entire northern region of Ethiopia - a very strategic
area. In fact, the Ethiopian government, over the years, has transformed
some of the food production into export crops. The TPLF which now controls most of this region, has instituted
land reforms and developed very good
relations with the small and mediumPage Six

Food convoys operated by REST move through rebel-held areas in Tigray guarded by members of the
TPLF.

sized farmers in the area. Even though
it has been hit by drought, there is still
a surplus of food here. Tigray has historically been an area that people have
migrated to during hard times. The
drought has been going on for a number of years and over the past few years
there has been a migration into western
Tigray. Last year alone 200,000 people
migrated and were resettled in the area.
In the middle of last year they met their
saturation point and began to send
people into Sudan.
Last summer things began to explode. In mid August (1984) REST
realized what was coming. There were
massive crop failures, 95 OJo in eastern
Tigray and 900Jo in central Tigray due
to drought and also infestation of what
they call army worms. There were 600Jo
losses in western Tigray. REST sent
out people to all the corners of Tigray
to do a quick survey. In September
they came out with a policy which they
implemented on the 1st of October.
They pulled back and consolidated
their relief efforts to western Tigray because they had so little food to distribResist Newsletter

ute and they stopped moving food into
central Tigray which had previously
been a component of their activities.
At that point, people were given two
choices: to go into a governmentcontrolled town for food, or if they
couldn't get food in a government
town, or didn't want to, REST would
manage their migration to Sudan
where hopefully, by the grace of God
and Allah, the world international
community would take care of them
(this happened in mid-October which
was when the world attention focused
on the situation).
The situation in the government
towns is not good. Migrants are coming out of the rural areas. They are
crossing the battle lines, the political
and military lines, in search of food. I
interviewed as many of the migrants as
I could in this region to try to piece together what had happened to them.
Clearly, thousands of people have
crossed into the cities and have gotten
food. People are getting fed but there's
not enough food in these towns to feed
all the people that are there.
March 1985

Some people are being asked to produce farmers association cards. Farmers associations are Ethiopian government institutions so, of course, the
people from Tigray didn't have them.
The argument of the government and
many relief workers is that identificaion is needed to avoid double counting.
That, in part, is true, but it's also an
obvious tactic, which we saw in Vietnam - to figure out what side of the
conflict people are on. And several
things happen once that determination
is made. People got food, but there
was generally harassment and delays.
People got sent to the back of the line
or told over and over to come back the
next day. If a single man walked up
they would ask him where his family
was, where were his kids. They would
tell him to bring his sons the next day,
and that they wanted to see his sons
before they gave him any food. In
some instances, people were beaten by
government authorities.
The first wave of people in early October went into the cities taking their
chances. A lot of them got food. Those
who didn't or who were harassed went
back to their villages and told the
others that it was hopeless. Whole villages that were two or three hours from
the nearest town packed up and walked
four to eight weeks to Sudan. Many of
them died along the way.
There is also a resettlement program
which is now fully under way. The
Ethiopian government is airlifting people out of the principal towns of
Makele, Bati, Koreni and others, using
Soviet carriers and helicopters, to take
them to southwestern Ethiopia. Their
stated goal is to resettle a million
Tigrayans to areas they feel are more
fertile. Even people who may have
thought about going into town for
food didn't because they knew that
many of their relatives and friends
were being resettled against their will.
Many of these people refused to go
anywhere near the cities, risking death
to move to Sudan.
The rate of migration is unbelievable. There are two principal routes.
They all converge in western Tigray.
The total number of people moving into western Tigray as of early December
was 5,000 every day.
On my trip into Tigray we left from
Kassala, on the border with Sudan, in a
food convoy of ten ten-ton Fiat trucks.
We moved at night because of the
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threat of aerial. bombardment by the
Ethiopian military. We crossed over
the border into Eritrea and then cut
south to the road across the desert.
Generally we traveled without mishap
on the trip I was on, though there were
several MIGs that flew overhead one
day. And the convoy ahead of us had a
skirmish with the "shifta" or bandits
who are armed by the Ethiopians.
The trip into Tigray was extraordinarily gruelling. The trucks run about
ten kilometers an hour over roads
which barely exist through desert and
hills. Each convoy includes about
10-15 trucks and is guarded by about
50 fighters.
During the day we would sit camouflaged under trees, sleeping, shooing
away the flies and talking to people.
The fighters would cook food and take
good care of the others on the convoy.
The fighters are also mobilized to respond to any disaster. At one point
during the trip the truck ahead of me,
the lead truck carrying 25 fighters,
stopped. It was late in the evening, just
getting dark, and there was something
rustling off to the right. There was a lot
of thorn brush so we couldn't see very
far. All the fighters except one, dove
off the truck with their guns and ran in
the direction of the noise. The woman
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fighter, who was left on top of the
truck, hauled out a huge machine gun,
an automatic weapon. It all happened
instantly. The rustling turned out to be
a shepherd with a flock of goats, so
there was no mishap.
You tend to forget that you are in
the middle of a war zone and that attacks happen constantly throughout
the region. And everywhere there was
this intense sense of comradery, everyone working together, everyone rallying around what their lives meant at
that point - which was saving their
people.
The first night in southwest Eritrea,
we saw maybe 800 people walking in a
group, villagers who had come from
eastern and central Tigray and had
walked many, many weeks to get to
this point, many of them dying along
the way. The next night a slightly larger
group of about 1,000 passed us by.
These were people in a very desperate
situation. They were having to make a
very agonizing decision about whether
or not to abandon forty stragglers who
had been slowing down the whole
group.
Every day as we got further and further into Tigray, the horror got worse.
Every day there would be more and
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more people; hundreds of thousands of
people who were barely alive; people
who were dressed in rags. Many of the
kids were naked. It's cold there at
night; it dropped down into the forties
at night and people didn't have any
blankets or shelter. When people are
already so weak, the temperature can
really take its toll.
Leaving Eritrea, we dropped down
into western Tigray where REST has
focused much of its relief activities.
They've set up forty check points. At
each point they supply food, water and
medical services to the best of their
ability. The idea is to keep people
taken care of during the day so they
can walk that night to the next check
point. They are in the process solely of
managing the migration and exodus of
their own people out of the country.
At one check point, Zela Zele, that I
visited when we first got to western
Tigray, there were 10,000 people. The
area was rolling arid hills with thorn
brush and patchy trees. Walking a couple of miles around, I saw thousands
and thousands of people in the dried
up stream beads. People were cooking
and sleeping and scratching wells in the
stream beds. The water at that point
was about two or three feet down.
REST supplies food and medical care
to all these people in a very organized
fashion. They operate wells and clinics
at all the check points.
I was surprised at how calm and organized the operation was when I first
got into western Tigray. The level of
organization was incredible and there
wasn't any chaotic activity. There
wasn't any clamoring after and fighting for places in trucks. All the empty
grain trucks ran out with 75 people on
each one of them. They tried to screen
all the sickest people and put them on a
truck for a ride out.
Because the rate of migration was increasing rapidly, REST had gone beyond its own capacity to feed people in
this area. They could feed about 50,000
to 80,000 at one time. That's about
where they were at the time I was there,
but the migration was starting to outpace their relief effort. On the way out
I saw the effect of that.
The organization started to break
down, and the calm also. Even though
people were desperate, it wasn't out of
control until we started going out. We
were already one day out and all the
trucks were filled with people. We
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spent one night at one of the transit
camps where there were about 7,000
people. The decision was made to take
some of the healthier people out of the
trucks to make room for some of the
very sick people who were in the camp.
So basically there was a new seating arrangement. The scene in the dusk was
just maddening. People were clawing
to get into those trucks. Kids were crying, mother were crying and tossing
their kids onto the trucks. Old men
were trying to climb on the back. As we
drove off, I'll never forget this, some
guy was carrying his kid and flung himself and his kid in front of the truck.
We barely stopped in time. He was that
desperate, knowing a ride on a truck
meant a ticket out to what he thought
was a prosperous situation in the
Sudan.
However, the situation in the Sudan
is very grim. When I visited Zela Zele
on the way out, there were 15,000 people where five days earlier there had
been 10,000. Crossing the border on
the way back into Sudan, migrants
were arriving at 1,200 per day, double
the number of a few days earlier.
No one disputes that the famine is
the worst in Tigray and in southern Eritrea. There's a very serious area in the
south called Sidamo and some in the
Ogaden, but the bulk of the people at
risk are in the areas of conflict. Once
you understand something about the
war and how destructive it's been, it's
·not surprising to see that the famine is
the worst there. I think we'll see a half
million people arrive in the Sudan in
the next few months. I think we'll see
over a half million dead in Tigray
alone.
There's been heavy ground fighting
in the region. This is the time of year
for offensives. Both the EPLF and the
TPLF fear that an offensive will soon
be mounted by the government. The
most worrisome thing that's· happened
recently was on December 11th when
there was a bombing and strafing of
drought victims who were migrating to
Sudan through a town called Shillalo in
Eritrea. Eighteen people were wounded
and 56 killed. Those reports have been
corroborated by survivors who are now
in camps in Sudan and have been interviewed by the media. At the time of the
bombing, the press viewed it as just another bombing, of which there are
many. The significance of it was that it
took place in Shillalo in Eritrea which
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lies on the principal migration route
out and the only lifeline into this
region.
There are also Ethiopian ground
forces in the area that could seal off the
region. That would mean certain death
to hundreds of thousands of people
within weeks. None of the food would
be able to get in and the people would
be trapped. These people are living day
to day and if REST misses one convoy,
there's no food. If they miss one convoy, people will starve, thousands of
people will starve. There's a convoy
going in every three days and if one of
them is blown up or delayed, even for a
few days, it will be translated into lost
lives. So the stakes are very high, they
are very high.
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